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European Community Antidumping 
Regulation: Law and Practice 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The European Economic Community (EEC or Community) will 
become a single trading partner on December 31, 1992.1 Under 
the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community 
(EEC Treaty), the Community has the obligation to set Commu-
nity-wide standards to protect trade from unfair competition.2 
Dumping constitutes one prevalent form of unfair competition. 
By imposing antidumping duties, the Community can protect 
local industries from foreign products dumped into the Com-
munity. Because foreign exporters may try to circumvent anti-
dumping duties by assembling the product within the Commu-
nity, thereby creating a "European" product, antidumping duties 
may be extended to component parts. 
I Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,298 U.N.T.S. 
11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. Article 8(a) of the EEC Treaty provides that the European 
Economic Community (EEC or Community) will become a single internal market "pro-
gressively ... over a period expiring on 31 December 1992, ... without internal frontiers 
in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured." [d. at art. 
8(a). Article 8(a) was added to the EEC Treaty by article 13 of the Single European Act, 
Feb. 17, 1986,300.]. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 1 (1987). 
2 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 113. Article 113(1) provides in part: "After the 
transitional period has ended, the common commercial policy shall be based on uniform 
principles, particularly in regard to ... measures to protect trade such as those to be 
taken in case of dumping .... " [d. at art. 113(1). Article 113(2) states that "[t]he 
Commission shall submit proposals to the Council for implementing the common com-
mercial policy." [d. at art. 113(2). Article 113(4) mandates that "the Council shall act by a 
qualified majority." [d. at art. 113(4). The Commission of the European Communities 
(Commission) proposes regulations which must pass through the Council of the European 
Communities (Council) to become binding on all member states. S. BtJDD, THE EEC: A 
GUIDE TO THE MAZE 33 (1987). For an introductory discussion of the history of the 
Community and the responsibilities of the governing bodies, see 1 LAW OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES paras. 1.01-1.69 (D. Vaughan ed. 1986); M. HOPKINS, POLICY FORMATION 
IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1-9 (1981); E. VERMULST, ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRAC-
TICE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 7-10 (1987); ].F. Bellis, The 
EEC Antidumping System, in ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE 41, 44-47 (]. Jackson & E. 
Vermulst eds. 1989) [hereinafter LAW AND PRACTICE]. See generally Deardorff, Economic 
Perspectives on Antidumping Law, in LAW AND PRACTICE, supra, at 23-39. 
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Community antidumping legislation must be in accordance 
with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).3 In 
1979, the Community entered into the Agreement on Implemen-
tation of Article VI of GATT (1979 Anti-Dumping Code).4 This 
agreement replaced the previous agreement, the 1968 Anti-
Dumping Code.5 The Council of the European Communities 
(Council) enacted Regulation 3017179 to remain in compliance 
with GATT obligations.6 In 1984, Regulation 2176/84 replaced 
3 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 
A3 (pts. 5-6), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]; Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VI, Apr. 12, 1979,31 U.S.T. 4919, T.I.A.S. No. 9650, GATT, 
BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 171, art. 16(6) (26th Supp. 1980) [here-
inafter 1979 Anti-Dumping Code]. "[GATT] is a world-wide, multilateral agreement 
aimed at the liberalization of international trade. It was concluded before the establish-
ment of the Community and all [m]ember [s]tates are parties to it." T. HARTLEY, THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 173 (2d ed. 1988); see 3]. PATTISON, AN-
TIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAWS 16-3 (1984). Along with the Community, 
the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Canada are among the twenty-five 
signatories to the 1979 Anti-Dumping Code. Jackson, Dumping in International Trade: Its 
Meaning and Practice, in LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 8 n.24 [hereinafter Dumping 
in International Trade]; Matsushita, Comments on Antidumping Law Enforcement in Japan, in 
LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 389-95; see K. SIMMONDS & B. HILL, LAW AND 
PRACTICE UNDER THE GATT 1-31 (1988); see generally K. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 167-77 (1970);]. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND 
THE LAW OF GATT 401-38 (1969); Koulen, Some Problems of Interpretation and Implemen-
tation of the GATT Antidumping Code, in LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 366-73. 
4 Decision 80/271, Council Decision of 10 December 1979 Concerning the Conclusion 
of the Multilateral Agreements Resulting from the 1973 to 1979 Trade Negotiations, 23 
0.]. EUR. COMM. (No. L 71) 1 (1980) [hereinafter Decision 80/271]. The Council approved 
the 1979 Anti-Dumping Code on behalf of the Community. Id. at art. 1(2). The text of 
the 1979 Anti-Dumping Code is reprinted after Decision 80/271. Id. at 90; see also ]. 
BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, ANTI-DUMPING AND ANTI-SUBSIDY LAw: THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITIES 3-18 (1986). The 1979 Anti-Dumping Code was negotiated during the Tokyo 
Round Agreements. See Dumping in International Trade, supra note 3, at 7-8. 
51979 Anti-Dumping Code, supra note 3, at art. 16(5). The previous antidumping code 
became effective on July 1, 1968. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, June 30, 
1967,651 U.N.T.S. 320, 19 U.S.T. 4348, T.I.A.S. No. 6431, GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 
AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 24 (15th Supp. 1968) [hereinafter 1968 Anti-Dumping Code]. 
The 1979 Anti-Dumping Code differed significantly from the 1968 Anti-Dumping Code. 
Dumping in International Trade, supra note 3, at 8 n.22. 
6]. PATTISON, supra note 3, at 16-3; ]. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 26. 
After becoming a signatory to the Tokyo Round Agreements, the Council passed Regu-
lation 3017179. Regulation 3017179, Council Regulation 3017179 of 20 December 1979 
on Protection Against Dumped or Subsidized Imports from Countries Not Members of 
the European Economic Community, 22 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 339) 1 (1979) [herein-
after Regulation 3017179]. Regulation 2176/84 replaced Regulation 3017179. Regulation 
2176/84, Council Regulation 2176/84 of 23 July 1984 on Protection Against Dumped or 
Subsidized Imports from Countries Not Members of the European Economic Community, 
27 0.]. EUR. COMM. (No. L 201) 1 (1984) [hereinafter Regulation 2176/84]; see Proposal 
for a Council Regulation Amending Regulation 3017179 on Protection Against Dumped 
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Regulation 3017179 as the Community's primary antidumping 
regulation.7 In 1987, the Council enacted Regulation 1761187 as 
a "technical" amendment to Regulation 2176/84.8 In 1988, the 
Council passed yet another antidumping law, Regulation 2423/88 
which incorporated all previous antidumping laws in the Com-
munity.9 
Part II of this Comment considers the provisions of Regulation 
2176/84. Part II also considers the amendment to this legislation, 
Regulation 1761187. Part III discusses the provisions of the most 
recent Community antidumping enactment, Regulation 2429/88, 
and how it differs from the previous antidumping law. Part IV 
or Subsidized Imports from Countries Not Members of the European Economic Com-
munity, COM(84) 232 final [hereinafter Proposed Regulation 2176/84). Provisions anal-
ogous to those in Regulation 2176/84 regarding dumped products from nonmembers of 
the European Coal and Steel Community are embodied in Decision 2177/84. Decision 
2177/84, Commission Decision of 27 July 1984 on Protection Against Dumped or Subsi-
dized Imports from Countries Not Members of the European Coal and Steel Community, 
270.]. EUR. COMM. (No. L 201) 17 (1984) [hereinafter Decision 2177/84). Regulation 
1580/82 amended Regulation 3017179. Regulation 1580/82, Council Regulation 1580/82 
of 14 June 1982 Amending Regulation 3017179 on Protection Against Dumped or Sub-
sidized Imports from Countries Not Members of the European Economic Community, 
25 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 178) 9 (1982); see]. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 
25-28. 
7 Regulation 2176/84, supra note 6, at art. 18; see]. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 
4, at 28-29. The changes the Commission proposed regarding Regulation 3017179 were 
codified in Regulation 2176/84. See generally Proposed Regulation 2176/84, supra note 6. 
Regulation 2176/84 implements the 1979 Anti-Dumping Code. E. VERMULST, supra note 
2, at 8-9. 
8 Regulation 1761187, Council Regulation 1761187 of 22 June 1987 Amending Regu-
lation 2176/84 on Protection Against Dumped or Subsidized Imports from Countries Not 
Members of the European Economic Community, 30 0.]. EUR. COMM. (No. L 167) 9 
(1987) [hereinafter Regulation 1761187). Regulation 1761/87 added subprovision 10 to 
article 13 of Regulation 2176/84. [d. Proposal for a Council Regulation Amending Reg-
ulation 2176/84 on Protection Against Dumped or Subsidized Imports from Countries 
Not Members of the European Economic Community, COM(87) 57 final [hereinafter 
Proposed Regulation 1761187). 
9 Regulation 2423/88, Council Regulation 2423/88 of II July 1988 on Protection Against 
Dumped or Subsidized Imports from Countries Not Members of the European Economic 
Community, 31 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 209) I (1988) [hereinafter Regulation 2423/88). 
Regulation 2423/88 repealed Regulation 2176/84 and the provision added to it by Reg-
ulation 1761/87. Regulation 2423/88, supra, at art. 18. Proposal for a Council Regulation 
Amending Regulation 2176/84 on Protection Against Dumped or Subsidized Imports 
from Countries Not Members of the European Economic Community, COM(88) 112 final 
[hereinafter Proposed Regulation 2423/88). Decision 2177/84, analogous to Regulation 
2176/84, was also repealed. Decision 2424/88, Commission Decision 2424/88 of 29 July 
1988 on Protection Against Dumped or Subsidized Imports from Countries Not Members 
of the European Coal and Steel Community, 31 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 209) 18, 31 
(1988). 
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reviews the Community's previous application of its antidumping 
legislation to the importation of ball bearings and their final intra-
Community assemblage. Part IV also examines a legal challenge 
made to the application of the legislation. This Comment con-
cludes that Regulation 2423/88 achieved its objective to clarify 
the Community's antidumping law, but that mere clarification 
was insufficient. 
II. PREVIOUS COMMUNITY ANTIDUMPING LAW: 
REGULATIONS 2176/84 AND 1761187 
The Council enacted Regulation 2176/84 as its primary anti-
dumping law in 1984.10 Three years later, the Council found the 
regulation inadequate and subsequently passed an amendment. 
A. Provisions of Regulation 2176/84 
Regulation 2176/84 attempted to protect the Community from 
injury caused by products dumped from outside the Community 
by imposing antidumping duties on the dumped products. I I Sev-
eral conditions must be met before an antidumping duty can be 
imposed upon a product. This Section examines the criteria used 
to determine whether a product has been dumped into the Com-
munity and whether the dumping has caused injury.12 
1. The Determination of Normal Value 
One condition that must be met before an antidumping duty 
is levied on a product is a finding that the normal value of the 
product or like product is greater than the product's export price 
IO Regulation 2176/84 repealed Regulation 3017179. Regulation 2176/84, supra note 6, 
at art. 18. 
I! Regulation 2176/84, supra note 6, at art. I; J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, 
at 41-52 (an introductory discussion of dumping). For a discussion of the procedures 
involved in initiating and conducting antidumping investigations, see id. at 173-205; E. 
VERMULST, supra note 2, at 194-225; Bellis, supra note 2, at 47-51. For a comparison of 
the procedures used in antidumping investigations in the United States and the Com-
munity, see E. VERMULST, supra note 2, at 311-33; Horlick, The United States Antidumping 
System, in LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 99-166. 
12 See Bellis, supra note 2, at 69-97 (discussion of the substantive determination of 
dumping, including dumping from non-market economies). 
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to the Community.13 The normal value of the product can be 
established by computing the price of the product in the ordinary 
course of trade in the exporting country or country of origin. 14 
If the product is sold in the Community for less than this amount, 
the imposition of an antidumping duty may be necessary.15 
If the product is not sold in the exporting country or country 
of origin, the computation of the normal value is more difficult. 
In this situation, the normal value under Regulation 2176/84 was 
determined in either of two ways.16 First, the normal value was 
the highest export price of a like product to a third country.17 
Second, if the product was not exported to a third country, the 
normal value was constructed. IS The constructed normal value 
13 Regulation 2176/84, supra note 6, at art. 2(2). Regulation 2176/84 defines a like 
product as that which is "alike in all respects, to the product under consideration, or, in 
the absence of such a product, another product which has characteristics closely resem-
bling those of the product under consideration." [d. at art. 2(12). "The decisive criterion 
... is the physical character of the product rather than its usage." J. BESELER & A. 
WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 88. The authors propose that "economic substitutes such as 
coal and oil, butter and margerine or wool and cotton" are not necessarily like products. 
[d.; see also E. VERMULST, supra note 2, at 629-31; Baker, "Like" Products and Commercial 
Reality, in LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 287-94. 
14 Regulation 2176/84, supra note 6, at art. 2(3)(a). The phrase "ordinary course of 
trade" is subject to varying interpretations as it is not explicitly defined in Community 
legislation. J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 54. Transactions made in the 
ordinary course of trade are generally thought to be those made "at arm's length in 
normal open market transactions." [d. "Monopoly or cartel prices are considered to be in 
the ordinary course of trade .... " [d. Sales at a loss over a long period of time are outside 
the definition of ordinary course of trade. [d. at 62; see also Regulation 2176/84, supra 
note 6, at art. 2(4). Sales made between a parent corporation and a subsidiary or between 
firms related in any way are deemed to be made outside the ordinary course of trade. J. 
BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 54-55. Firms are related when "one controls the 
other or when both are jointly controlled by a third." [d. at 55. The rationale for treating 
related firms as not trading at arm's length is that the firms' relationship may influence 
prices and costs. [d. at 54. The firms may also be affected by arrangements which are 
compensatory in nature. [d. at 55. 
Even if the product is sold in the exporting country, however, if a proper comparison 
of the sales prices in the exporting country and the Community cannot be made, the 
normal value is not computed this way. See E. VERMULST, supra note 2, at 416-38; J. 
BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 52-80. 
15 See Regulation 2176/84, supra note 6, at arts. 2(1), 2(2). An antidumping duty may 
not be required, however, if the dumping does not cause injury. See infra notes 28-32 
and accompanying text. 
16 Regulation 2176/84, supra note 6, at art. 2(3)(b). 
17 [d. at art. 2(3)(b)(i). Although the export price may be set at the highest export price 
to any third country, it should be a representative export price. [d. Regulation 2176/84 
provides four ways to construct the normal value when sales at a loss are made over a 
long period of time and at prices which do not allow recovery of costs within a reasonable 
time in the ordinary course of trade. [d. at art. 2(4). 
IBId. at art. 2(3)(b)(ii); see J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 58-61. 
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was determined by adding the cost of production to a reasonable 
profit margin. The cost of production was constructed by deter-
mining the costs of materials and manufacturing as well as the 
selling, administrative, and other general expenses. 19 The reason-
able profit margin under Regulation 2176/84 was the profit nor-
mally realized on the same category of products in the market 
where the product is produced or exported.20 
2. The Determination of Export Price 
If an antidumping duty is to be imposed, it must not exceed 
the dumping margin. 21 The dumping margin is the difference 
between the normal value and the export price to the Commu-
nity.22 Consequently, before any definitive antidumping duty can 
be imposed by the Council, a determination of the export price 
must also occur.23 
Like the normal value of a product, the export price can be 
either the actual price or a constructed price if the actual price 
is indeterminable.24 The actual export price under Regulation 
2176/84 was the price that would be paid for the product in the 
Community.25 The constructed export price was more difficult to 
determine. If the export price had to be calculated, it was deemed 
to be the price at which the product was sold to the first inde-
pendent buyer, plus an allowance. 26 The export price was deter-
mined on any reasonable basis if the product was not sold to an 
19 Regulation 2176/84, supra note 6, at art. 2(3)(b)(ii). The cost of manufacture includes 
both fixed and variable costs of the materials and manufacture of the product. [d. 
20 [d. 
21 [d. at art. 13(3). See J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 112-15 (discussion of 
the dumping margin). 
22 Regulation 2176/84, supra note 6, at art. 2(l3)(a). For a discussion of the allowances 
and adjustments that may be made in order to achieve a fair comparison, see J. BESELER 
& A. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 89-112. 
23 See Regulation 2176/84, supra note 6, at art. 2(2); E. VERMULST, supra note 2, at 438-
54; J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 80-88. For a comparative analysis of the 
export price and normal value as used in the United States and the Community, see E. 
VERMULST, supra note 2, at 481-500. 
24 Compare Regulation 2176/84, supra note 6, at art. 2(8)(b) with art. 2(3)(b)(ii); see J. 
BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 80-86. 
25 Regulation 2176/84, supra note 6, at art. 2(8)(a). 
26 [d. at art. 2(8)(b). An allowance for costs associated with transportation, insurance, 
customs duties, and taxes, as well as a reasonable profit margin, are to be included in the 
constructed export price. [d. 
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independent buyer or the product was not imported into the 
Community in the same condition in which it was sold.27 
3. The Determination of Injury 
Once the Commission determined that the normal value ex-
ceeded the export price, the Commission determined whether a 
Community industry had been injured.28 In its injury determi-
nation, the Commission was previously bound by Regulation 
2176/84 which listed several factors that were indicative of injury. 
The first factor was whether the volume of dumped imports into 
the Community increased. The second factor was whether the 
price of the dumped product was considerably lower than that 
of a like product. The final factor was the impact of the dumping 
on Community industries. The regulation instructed the Com-
mission to look at such things as sales, market share, production 
rates, and profits.29 
In addition to imposing a provisional antidumping duty for 
past injuries, the regulation empowered the Commission to im-
pose a provisional antidumping duty when there was a threat of 
injury to a Community industry.3o The Commission determined 
whether the threat of injury would develop into actual injury to 
a Community industry.31 Under Regulation 2176/84, the Com-
mission would have looked at how the volume of imports varied 
'7Id. 
'SId. at art. 2(1). Regulation 2176/84 defines a Community industry as "Community 
producers as a whole of the like product or ... those of them whose collective output of 
the products constitutes a major proportion of the total Community production of those 
products." Id. at art. 4(5). A Community producer that is an importer of the dumped 
product or related to an exporter or importer is not included within the definition of a 
Community industry. Id. If the Community is divided into more than two markets for a 
product, the producers in one of the markets sell all or almost all of the production in 
that market, and producers elsewhere in the Community do not supply the demand in 
that market, the producers within each market may be considered a Community industry. 
Id. For additional information on the injury determination, see E. VERMULST, supra note 
2, at 631-57; J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 147-72. For a comparison of 
the injury determination in the United States and the Community, see E. VERMULST, supra 
note 2, at 673-92; Vermulst, Injury Determinations in Antidumping Investigations in the United 
States and the European Community, 7 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 301 (1986) . 
• 9 Regulation 2176/84, supra note 6, at art. 4(2). 
30Id. at arts. 4(1), 4(3). According to Regulation 2176/84, an injury is found when the 
dumped products are "causing or threatening to cause material injury to an established 
Community industry or materially retarding the establishment of such an industry." Id. 
at art. 4(1). 
31Id. at art. 4(3). 
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over time. The regulation also required the Commission to de-
termine whether the exports from the exporting country or coun-
try of origin to the Community could, and the probability that 
they would, increase in the foreseeable future. 32 
In summary, before an antidumping duty could be imposed 
on a product under Regulation 2176/84, the product must have 
been imported from a nonmember state, sold in the Community 
for less than its normal value, and caused or threatened to cause 
injury to a Community industry. 
B. Provisions of Regulation 1761/87 
The first condition to the application of Regulation 2176/84 
was that the product be imported from outside the Community.33 
One way for producers of imported products to avoid the appli-
cation of Regulation 2176/84 was to conduct the final assembly 
of the product within the Community, thereby producing a "Eu-
ropean" product exempt from any restrictions on its trade.34 As 
a result, the Council found that widespread circumvention of 
Regulation 2176/84 posed a threat to the Community and 
amended Regulation 2176/84 in 1987.35 Regulation 1761187 al-
lowed the Commission to investigate the production activities of 
"assembly plants" and, where necessary, impose duties on those 
products. 36 
Regulation 1761187 required that certain conditions be met 
before the Commission could impose a provisional antidumping 
32Id. at arts. 4(3)(a)-(b). 
33 See id. at art. 1; Proposed Regulation 1761/87, supra note 8, at Explanatory Memo-
randum. 
34 Regulation 1761187, supra note 8, at 9. See also COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITIES, SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT ON THE COMMUNITY'S ANTI-DUMPING AND ANTI-SUBSIDY 
ACTIVITIES, COM(89) 106 final, at 12 (1989) [hereinafter SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT]; Pro-
posed Regulation 1761/87, supra note 8, at Explanatory Memorandum. 
35 Regulation 1761187, supra note 8, at 9; SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 34, at 12. 
36 Regulation 1761/87, supra note 8, at 9; SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 34, at 12; 
see New Developments, Nissan Cars Manufactured in Britain are "Made in japan," France 
Charges, [1985-1988 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 11,028 (1988). In a 
recent dispute, France maintained its position that Nissan cars built in the U.K. would 
not be considered European until at least 80 percent of their parts originated within the 
Community.Id. Last year, after intervention by the Commission, France agreed to remove 
all restrictions on the cars assembled by Nissan in the United Kingdom. New Develop-
ments, France Removes Obstacles to Import of japanese Cars Manufactured in the U.K., 4 
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 95,134 (1989); see also Griffith, Antidumping Duties on Parts 
in the EEC, in LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 311-25; see generally Steenbergen, 
Circumvention of Antidumping Duties by Importation of Parts and Materials: Recent EEC Anti-
dumping Rules, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 332 (1988); De Smedt, EC Anti-dumping Law: EC 
Applies Duties to Foreign-owned Assembly Operations in the EC, 15 INT'L Bus. LAW. 479 (1987). 
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duty on products produced in such assembly plants. 37 Intra-Com-
munity assembly had to be conducted by a company that was 
either related to or associated with a foreign exporter dumping 
like products into the Community.38 Such a relationship could 
exist between a foreign parent corporation and a European sub-
sidiary.39 Second, the assembly or production levels must have 
either begun or increased substantially after the opening of the 
initial antidumping investigation of the related or associated man-
ufacturer before a provisional antidumping duty could be im-
posed. Most importantly, the product's component parts made in 
the Community had to be below a certain level of the total value 
of the product.40 Specifically, the value of the component parts 
of the product originating in the importing country must have 
exceeded the value of all other component parts by at least 50 
percent.41 Therefore, Regulation 1761187 made it more difficult 
for manufacturers outside the Community to take advantage of 
the Community's internal free market. 
To ensure fairness, Regulation 1761187 also required that each 
instance of alleged circumvention be handled with regard to three 
factors: the costs associated with production in the Community, 
the amount of research and development that occurred in the 
Community, and the amount of technology invested in the Com-
munity.42 Despite the Community's interest in encouraging in-
vestment in the Community, it had to balance investment against 
the circumvention of its antidumping laws.43 
III. CURRENT COMMUNITY ANTIDUMPING LAW: 
REGULATION 2423/88 
The Council updated the Community'S antidumping law be-
cause of difficulties in achieving correct interpretation and ap-
plication.44 Regulation 2423/88 became effective in August 1988, 
37 See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text. 
38 Regulation 1761187, supra note 8, at art. 1. The Commission has great discretion in 
defining the terms "related" and "associated." Griffith, supra note 36, at 312. 
39 See infra notes 104-11 and accompanying text. 
40 Regulation 1761187, supra note 8, at art. 1; Griffith, supra note 36, at 313-14. The 
Commission is concerned with a part's "value" not its "price." !d. at 314. 
41 Regulation 1761187, supra note 8, at art. 1; see infra notes 104-11 and accompanying 
text. "[I]n practice ... the value of [foreign] parts must be more than 60% of all parts." 
Griffith, supra note 36, at 313. 
42 Regulation 1761187, supra note 8, at art. 1. 
43 See id. 
44 Regulation 2423/88, supra note 9, at 3; Proposed Regulation 2423/88, supra note 9, 
at 1. 
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and incorporates both Regulations 2176/84 and 1761187, but 
makes minor changes to their provisions.45 
Both Regulation 2423/88 and Regulation 2176/84 provide a 
methodology for the calculation of a product's normal value.46 
Where the product is sold in the ordinary course of trade on the 
domestic market of the exporting country or country of origin, 
the normal value is simply the price paid or payable for the 
productY This definition, so far, is identical to that in Regulation 
2176/84.48 Regulation 2423/88, however, continues by providing 
that the price paid or payable for a product shall be reduced by 
the amount of discounts and rebates directly linked to the sales 
of the product. Regulation 2423/88 also states that deferred dis-
counts directly related to sales can be recognized only if the 
exporter supplies evidence to show that these discounts are based 
on consistent prior practice.49 
In the event that there are no sales of a like product in the 
exporting country or country of origin, the price of the like 
product in a third country will be the product's normal value. 50 
This provision is identical to the corresponding provision in Reg-
ulation 2176/84.51 The normal value, however, can also be con-
structed by adding the costs of production to a reasonable profit 
margin.52 The costs of production are determined, in both Reg-
ulations 2176/84 and 2423188, on the basis of costs of materials 
and manufacture in the country of origin, plus a reasonable 
amount for the selling, administrative, and other general expens-
es.53 Unlike Regulation 2176/84, however, Regulation 2423/88, 
45 See generally Regulation 2423/88, supra note 9. The amendments which the Commis-
sion proposed to the Council are embodied in Regulation 2423/88. See Proposed Regu-
lation 2423/88, supra note 9, at 3-8. One new condition of Regulation 2423/88 is the 
requirement that importers or their customers pay the antidumping duties. Bellis, supra 
note 2, at 59. 
46 Compare Regulation 2423/88, supra note 9, at art. 2(3) with Regulation 2176/84, supra 
note 6, at art. 2(3). 
47 Regulation 2423/88, supra note 9, at art. 2(3)(a). 
48 Compare Regulation 2423/88, supra note 9, at art. 2(3)(a) with Regulation 2176/84, 
supra note 6, at art. 2(3)(a). See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
49 Regulation 2423/88, supra note 9, at art. 2(3)(a). Proposed Regulation 2423/88, supra 
note 9, at 3. 
50 Regulation 2423/88, supra note 9, at art. 2(3)(b)(i). 
51 Compare Regulation 2423/88, supra note 9, at art. 2(3)(b)(i) with Regulation 2176/84, 
supra note 6, at art. 2(3)(b)(i). 
52 Regulation 2423/88, supra note 9, at art. 2(3)(b)(ii). 
53 Compare Regulation 2423/88, supra note 9, at art. 2(3)(b)(ii) with Regulation 2176/84, 
supra note 6, at art. 2(3)(b)(ii). 
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the most recent legislation, provides a means for calculating these 
selling, administrative, and general expenses.54 
There are three alternative methods by which to calculate the 
selling, administrative, and general expenses. 55 The first method 
requires a determination of the producer's expenses and profits 
in profitable sales of the like product in the exporting market. 
The second method is to be used only if the prior method is 
unavailable, unreliable, or unsuitable. This method requires the 
calculation of the selling, administrative, and general expenses to 
be based upon the expenses and profits of other producers in 
the exporting country profitably selling the like product. Finally, 
if the Commission determines that the first and second methods 
are inapplicable, it may look to the expenses and profits related 
to sales by either the exporter or other exporters in the same 
general business sector. 56 
The provisions regarding the calculation of the export price 
were not altered significantly. 57 The export price is that price 
which is paid or payable for the product in the Community.58 
Regulation 2423/88, however, mandates that this price be reduced 
by the amount of the taxes, discounts, and rebates directly linked 
to the sales which form the basis of the Commission's inquiry. 59 
This provision is similar to the provision mandating that the 
normal value be determined net of discounts and rebates.6o 
The costs incurred between the time the product enters the 
Community and subsequent resale are not included in the con-
structed export price.61 A reasonable profit margin is included in 
the calculation of this allowance.62 The new provision in Regu-
lation 2423/88 specifies that the costs to be included are those 
54 [d.; Proposed Regulation 2423/88, supra note 9, at 3-4. 
55 Regulation 2423/88, supra note 9, at art. 2(3)(b)(ii). 
56 [d. 
57 Compare Regulation 2434/88, supra note 9, at art. 2(8) with Regulation 2176/84, supra 
note 6, at art. 2(8). 
58 Regulation 2423/88, supra note 9, at art. 2(8)(a); Regulation 2176/84, supra note 6, at 
art. 2(8)(a). 
59 Regulation 2423/88, supra note 9, at art. 2(8)(a); Proposed Regulation 2423/88, supra 
note 9, at 4. 
60 Compare Regulation 2423/88, supra note 9, at art. 2(8)(a) with art. 2(3)(a). 
61 [d. at art. 2(8)(b). Regulation 2423/88, in contrast to Regulation 2176/84, does not 
permit the duties and taxes to be included in the allowance. Regulation 2423/88, supra 
note 9, at art. 2(8)(b); Regulation 2176/84, supra note 6, at art. 2(8)(b); Proposed Regu-
lation 2423/88, supra note 9, at 4-5. 
62 Regulation 2423/88, supra note 9, at art. 2(8)(b); Proposed Regulation 2423/88, supra 
note 9, at 4-5. 
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that would normally be incurred by an importer.63 As did Reg-
ulation 2176/84, Regulation 2423/88 lists the costs of transport, 
insurance, taxes, and duties as those which could be included in 
the allowance. Despite several changes between the older and 
newer legislation, the Council did not alter the injury determi-
nation.64 
IV. ApPLICATION OF ANTIDUMPING LEGISLATION BY COMMUNITY 
INSTITUTIONS 
Since the Community became a signatory to the 1968 Anti-
Dumping Code, the Community institutions, the Commission, 
the Council, and the European Court of Justice (European 
Court), have had ample opportunity to apply and review the 
application of antidumping legislation.65 Two exporters, Nippon 
63 Regulation 2423/88, supra note 9, at art. 2(8)(b). 
64 Compare Regulation 2423/88, supra note 9, at arts. 2(8)(b), 4 with Regulation 2176/84, 
supra note 6, at arts. 2(8)(b), 4. 
65 Between 1980 and 1987, the Commission opened more than 300 antidumping in-
vestigations. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES ON THE COMMUNITY'S ANTI-DUMPING AND 
ANTI-SUBSIDY ACTIVITIES, COM(83) 519 final/2, at 2 (the Commission initiated 25, 48, 
and 58 investigations in 1980, 1981, and 1982, respectively) [hereinafter FIRST ANNUAL 
REPORT); COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ON THE 
COMMUNITY'S ANTI-DUMPING AND ANTI-SUBSIDY ACTIVITIES, COM(84) 721 final, at 3 (38 
antidumping investigations were opened in 1983) [hereinafter SECOND ANNUAL REPORT); 
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 
TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ON THE COMMUNITY'S ANTI-DUMPING AND ANTI-SUBSIDY 
ACTIVITIES, COM(86) 308 final, at 3 (49 investigations were opened in 1984) [hereinafter 
THIRD ANNUAL REpORT); COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FOURTH ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ON THE COMMUNITY'S ANTI-
DUMPING AND ANTI-SUBSIDY ACTIVITIES, COM(87) 178 final, at 3 (36 investigations opened 
in 1985) [hereinafter FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT); COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITIES, FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE COMMUNITY'S ANTI-DUMPING 
AND ANTI-SUBSIDY ACTIVITIES, COM(88) 92 final, at 3 (24 investigations were opened in 
1986) [hereinafter FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT); SIXTH ANNUAL REpORT, supra note 34, at 3 
(39 investigations were opened in 1987). Of the more than 300 antidumping investigations 
opened, only 99 were closed without the application of protective measures. FIRST ANNUAL 
REPORT, supra, at 2, 4 (in 1980, 1981, and 1982, respectively, 13, 14, and 9 investigations 
were closed without the application of protective measures); SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, 
supra, at 6 (in 1983, 11 investigations were closed without the application of protective 
measures); THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra, at 5 (10 investigations were closed in 1984 
without protective measures); FOURTH ANNUAL REpORT, supra, at 6 (20 investigations were 
closed in 1985 without protective measures); FIFTH ANNUAL REpORT, supra, at 2 (18 
investigations were terminated in 1986 without protective measures); SIXTH ANNUAL 
REPORT, supra note 34, at 5 (4 investigations were concluded in 1987 without the appli-
cation of protective measures); Bellis, supra note 2, at 42-43. Japan had the highest 
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Seiko KK (Nippon) and NTN Toyo Bearing (Toyo), have been 
the subject of Community investigations under Regulations 2176/ 
84 and 1761187.66 This Section examines the institutions' appli-
cation of the Community antidumping legislation to these two 
Japanese exporters. This Section also discusses Nippon and 
Toyo's legal challenges to the Council's imposition of definitive 
antidumping duties. Because articles 2(3) and 2(8) of Regulation 
2423/88 do not differ significantly from previous antidumping 
legislation, understanding the Community's previous treatment 
of these provisions is essential to predict the outcome of similar 
cases under Regulation 2423188. 
A. The Council and Commission's Interpretation of Antidumping 
Legislation 
In September 1979, the Commission opened an investigation 
relating to the dumping of ball bearings imported into the Com-
munity from, inter alia, Japan.67 The Commission investigated 
charges against the foreign exporters Nippon and Toyo.58 After 
being informed of the Commission's findings, Nippon and Toyo 
offered undertakings to the Commission which were accepted in 
1981. 69 In 1983, the Commission opened another investigation 
number of exporters involved in Community antidumping investigations between 1985 
and 1987. SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 34. at 6. For information on administrative 
and judicial review of investigations, see Bellis, supra note 2, at 63-68. 
66 The earlier investigations were conducted under Regulation 3017179. Because Reg-
ulation 3017179 is substantially similar to Regulations 2176/84 and 2423/88, those earlier 
investigations are relevant to this discussion. 
67 Notice of Initiation of the Anti-dumping/Anti-subsidy Procedure Concerning Ball 
Bearings and Tapered Roller Bearings Originating in Japan, Poland, Romania and the 
USSR, 22 0.]. EUR. COMM. (No. C 235) 2 (1979). This investigation did not differentiate 
between small and large ball bearings. See id. Some subsequent investigations, however, 
were limited to small ball bearings. Small ball bearings are used in the manufacture of 
"computer equipment, consumer electronics, precision mechanics and other high-tech-
nology areas." Nippon Seiko KK v. Council (Case 258/84), 1987 E. Comm. Ct. ]. Rep. 
1923, 1930, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 14,369 (1987) 
[hereinafter Nippon]. Large ball bearings are used in "engineering, motor-car production 
and the iron and steel industry." Id. 
68 Decision 81/406, Commission Decision of 4 June 1981 Accepting Undertakings in 
Connection with the Anti-dumping Proceedings Concerning Imports of Ball and Tapered 
Roller Bearings, Originating in Japan, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union and 
Terminating that Proceeding, 24 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 152) 44 (1981) [hereinafter 
Decision 81/406]. 
69Id. at art. 1. The exporters offered to either eliminate the dumping margin or 
eliminate the injurious effects of the dumping. Id. at 46. A majority of antidumping 
investigations are concluded with the acceptance of undertakings. Bellis, supra note 2, at 
43,52-55;]. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 212-22. 
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of Nippon and Toyo involving the dumping of small ball bearings 
into the Community. This investigation included a review of the 
1981 undertakings insofar as they involved small ball bearings.70 
Upon an affirmative finding of injury from the dumping of small 
ball bearings into the Community, the Commission imposed a 
provisional antidumping duty on small ball bearings manufac-
tured by Nippon and Toyo in 1984.71 During that same year, the 
Commission also received a separate request for review of the 
undertakings involving large ball bearings.72 The Commission 
concluded the investigation with the imposition of provisional 
antidumping duties on large ball bearings manufactured by Nip-
pon and Toyo.73 In 1984 and 1985, the Council imposed defini-
tive antidumping duties on smalF4 and large75 ball bearings man-
ufactured by Nippon and Toyo. 
70 Notice of Initiation of an Anti-dumping Proceeding Concerning Imports of Certain 
Ball Bearings Originating in Japan and Singapore, 26 0.]. EUR. COMM. (No. C 188) 8 
(1983) [hereinafter Notice to Initiate Investigation]. 
71 Regulation 744/84, Commission Regulation 744/84 of 19 March 1984 Imposing a 
Provisional Anti-dumping Duty on Imports of Certain Ball Bearings Originating in Japan 
and Singapore, 27 0.]. EUR. COMM. (No. L 79) 8 (1984) [hereinafter Regulation 744/84]; 
Corrigendum to Commission Regulation 744/84 of 19 March 1984 Imposing a Provisional 
Anti-dumping Duty on Imports of Certain Ball Bearings Originating in Japan and Sin-
gapore, 27 0.]. EUR. COMM. (No. L 86) 31 (1984) [hereinafter Corrigendum]. The 
corrected provisional duty imposed on the products produced by Nippon Seiko KK 
(Nippon) was 18.30 percent and 18.45 percent for those ball bearings made by NTN 
Toyo Bearing Co. Ltd. (Toyo). [d. 
72 Notice 84/C 101104, Notice of Re-opening of an Anti-dumping Investigation Con-
cerning Imports of Certain Ball and Tapered Roller Bearings Originating in Japan, 27 
0.]. EUR. COMM. (No. C 101) 11 (1984). This investigation involved large ball bearings, 
for which the Commission had previously accepted undertakings in Decision 811406. [d.; 
see supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
73 Regulation 3669/84, Commission Regulation 3669/84 of21 December 1984 Imposing 
a Provisional Anti-dumping Duty on Imports of Certain Ball Bearings and Tapered Roller 
Bearings Originating in Japan, 27 0.]. EUR. COMM. (No. L 340) 37 (1984). The Commis-
sion imposed a provisional duty of 16.26 percent on Nippon's ball bearings and 2.01 
percent on Toyo's ball bearings. [d. at art. 2(2). 
74 Regulation 2089/84, Council Regulation 2089/84 of 19 July 1984 Imposing a Defin-
itive Anti-dumping Duty on Imports of Certain Ball Bearings Originating in Japan and 
Singapore, 270.]. EUR. COMM. (No. L 193) 1 (1984) [hereinafter Regulation 2089/84]. 
Regulation 2089/84 imposed a definitive duty of 14.71 percent against Nippon's small 
ball bearings and 11.97 percent against Toyo's small ball bearings. [d. at art. 1(2). Both 
Nippon and Toyo challenged this regulation in the European Court of Justice (European 
Court). See infra notes 112-23 and accompanying text. 
75 Regulation 1739/85, Council Regulation 1739/85 of 24 June 1985 Imposing a Defin-
itive Anti-dumping Duty on Imports of Certain Ball Bearings and Tapered Roller Bear-
ings Originating in Japan, 28 0.]. EUR. COMM. (No. L 167) 3 (1985) [hereinafter Regu-
lation 1739/85]. Regulation 1739/85 established a definitive duty of 16.7 percent for 
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In 1984, Nippon and Toyo filed separate applications with the 
European Court requesting that Regulation 2089/84, which im-
posed definitive antidumping duties on both exporters, be de-
clared void.76 The European Court ruled against both parties. 77 
In 1988, the Commission commenced another investigation upon 
the allegation that Nippon and Toyo were importing Japanese 
parts into the Community and assembling them in violation of 
Regulation 2176/84.78 The Commission determined that Nippon 
and Toyo were not acting in violation of Regulation 2176/84 and 
closed the investigation.79 This Section examines how the Com-
mission and the Council determined that Nippon and Toyo in-
juriously dumped small ball bearings into the Community and 
that their subsequent intra-Community assembly of ball bearings 
was legal. 80 
1. The Commission's Imposition of Provisional Antidumping 
Duties upon Japanese Ball Bearings 
In March of 1983, the Federation of European Bearing Man-
ufacturers' Associations (FEBMA), representing the Community 
ball bearings industry, petitioned the Commission to investigate 
an allegation of dumping.81 Based on the evidence provided by 
FEBMA, the Commission concluded that an investigation of the 
situation was warranted. The Commission concluded the inves-
Nippon's large ball bearings and 3.2 percent for Toyo's large ball bearings. [d. at art. 
1(2)(a). 
76 See generally Nippon, supra note 67; NTN Toyo Bearing Company Limited v. Council 
(Case 240/84), 1987 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1809, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Common 
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 14,368 (1987) [hereinafter Toyo]. 
77 See Nippon, supra note 67, at 1959-73 (the European Court rejected all of Nippon's 
submissions); Toyo, supra note 76, at 1850-59 (the European Court also rejected Toyo's 
submissions). 
78 Notice 88/C 150/03, Notice of Opening an Investigation Pursuant to Article 13(10) 
of Council Regulation 2176/84 Concerning Certain Ball Bearings Assembled in the Com-
munity, 31 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 150) 4 (1988) [hereinafter Notice 88/C 150/03]. Article 
13(10) was added to Regulation 2176/84 by Regulation 1761187. See supra note 8 and 
accompanying text. 
79 Decision 89/57, Commission Decision of 20 January 1989 Terminating the Proceed-
ings Under Article 13(10) of Regulation 2423/88 Concerning Certain Ball Bearings As-
sembled in the Community, 32 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 25) 90 (1989) [hereinafter Decision 
89/57]. While the Commission initiated this investigation under Regulation 2176/84, it 
terminated the proceeding under Regulation 2423/88. Compare Decision 89/57, supra with 
Notice 88/C 150/03, supra note 78. 
BO See infra notes 81-111 and accompanying text. 
81 Regulation 744/84, supra note 71, at para. 1; Corrigendum, supra note 71. 
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tigation by finding that provisional antidumping duties were war-
ranted.82 
The Commission determined that the normal value for Nippon 
and Toyo would be based on their domestic prices where those 
prices were considered representative of the Japanese domestic 
market. 83 The Commission determined the export prices to the 
Community in two ways. For the Japanese firm which sold the 
exports to an independent importer, the Commission primarily 
based the export price on the price actually paid or payable for 
the product. The Commission constructed the export price, how-
ever, when the exports were made to subsidiaries within the 
Community. The constructed export price is the price at which 
the product is sold to the first independent buyer in the Com-
munity minus the costs incurred between import and resale.84 
The Commission next investigated whether the dumping 
caused or threatened to cause injury within the Community.85 
The Commission found that sales of small ball bearings imported 
from Japan and Singapore increased significantly during the in-
vestigation period. For example, the ball bearing sales amounted 
to 22,670,000 units in 1979; 26,337,000 units in 1982; and 
18,538,000 units for the first six months of 1983. Japan and 
Singapore concurrently increased their market share of the prod-
uct from 17.5 percent to 27.9 percent.86 
In investigating the existence or threatened existence of injury 
to the Community, the Commission also examined the effect of 
the dumping on the Community.87 The Commission found that, 
in most cases, the resale price of the product was so low that the 
Community producers could not match the price and still recover 
their costs and a reasonable profit. The evidence revealed that, 
in some situations, Community producers' prices were undercut 
82 Regulation 744/84, supra note 71, at para. 3, art. 2; Corrigendum, supra note 71; 
Notice to Initiate Investigation, supra note 118, at 8. 
83 Regulation 744/84, supra note 71, at para. 11. For exporters from Singapore, the 
Commission constructed the normal value because there were virtually no sales of a like 
product on the domestic market. Id. at paras. 13-16. 
84Id. at paras. 17-18. The customs duty and a reasonable profit margin were subtracted 
from the constructed export price. Id. 
85 See Regulation 744/84, supra note 71, at paras. 23-32. For the provisions regarding 
injury, see Regulation 2176/84, supra note 6, at art. 4; see infra notes 86-88 and accom-
panying text. 
86 Regulation 744/84, supra note 71, at para. 23. 
87Id. at paras. 24-31. 
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by 44.8 percent. The Commission estimated that Community 
production fell 4.5 percent between 1979 and 1983. The utiliza-
tion of capacity of the entire Community industry of ball bearings 
fell 19 percent between 1979 and 1983. Sales of ball bearings 
made by Community producers fell 13.3 percent between 1979 
and the first six months of 1983. The concurrent decrease in 
market share for the Community producers was 11.1 percent. 
The Commission noted that employment in firms specializing in 
the product decreased 9 percent between 1979 and the first six 
months of 1983. Other factors which led to the imposition of the 
provisional duty were that the Community industry's financial 
losses resulted from competition for market share at price levels 
below cost and that the Community's small ball bearing industry 
was not being significantly injured by exports from third coun-
tries or reduction in demand.88 
After considering the cumulative effect of these factors, the 
Commission decided that exports from Japan and Singapore 
were being dumped into the Community and causing injury to a 
Community industry.89 The Commission imposed provisional an-
tidumping duties on the products, including those of Nippon and 
Toyo, equal to the provisionally established dumping margin. 
The provisional duties were to apply for four months, unless the 
Council imposed definitive antidumping duties on the affected 
exporters' products before that time.90 
2. The Council's Imposition of Definitive Antidumping 
Duties upon Nippon and Toyo's Ball Bearings 
Four months after the Commission imposed provisional anti-
dumping duties upon ball bearings made by Nippon and Toyo, 
the Council imposed definitive antidumping duties upon both 
exporters' products.91 The Council relied, to a large extent, on 
the Commission's findings. The definitive antidumping duties 
imposed by the Council, however, were not identical to the pro-
visional duties imposed by the Commission.92 
88/d. at paras. 24, 26-31. 
89Id. at para. 32. 
90 [d. at para. 34, art. 4. 
91 Regulation 2089/84, supra note 74, at arts. 1-3. 
92 Compare Regulation 2089/84. supra note 74, at art. 1(2) with Regulation 744/84, supra 
note 71, at art. 2(2); Corrigendum, supra note 71 (the Council imposed duties lower than 
those imposed by the Commission); see supra notes 71, 74, and accompanying text. 
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The Council calculated the definitive antidumping duties by 
first calculating the dumping margin of the Japanese ball bearing 
exporters.93 The Council established the normal value of the ball 
bearings at the price paid by unrelated purchasers on the do-
mestic market. If an exporting company sold directly to unrelated 
purchasers as well as through its own sales subsidiaries, the Coun-
cil used only the average combined prices paid by unrelated 
purchasers as the normal value.94 The Commission, in contrast, 
based its provisional determination of the normal value on the 
exporters' representative domestic prices of ball bearings.95 In 
practice, the different standards applied by the Commission and 
Council probably yield similar results; both tests seek to deter-
mine the price at which the exporter would normally cover its 
costs and recover a profit. 
The Council's calculation of the dumping margin did not in-
volve a specific recalculation of the export prices to the Com-
munity, except for Toyo.96 The Council determined the definitive 
antidumping duty by comparing the normal value with export 
prices on a transactional basis. Because Toyo had not allowed the 
Commission to verify information relating to a Community-based 
subsidiary, the Commission based its determination of the dump-
ing margin on the best available information. After the calculation 
of the provisional duty by the Commission, Toyo permitted the 
verification to occur, resulting in a reduced definitive antidump-
ing duty.97 Maintaining the Commission's findings regarding in-
jury in the Community, the Council imposed definitive duties on 
ball bearings made by both Nippon and Toyo.98 The Council 
believed that the definitive duties were in the Community's inter-
est and that price undertakings would not be a satisfactory solu-
tion.99 
Both the Commission and Council employed essentially the 
same method to calculate the antidumping duties to be imposed 
93 See Regulation 2089/84, supra note 74, at para. 11. 
94 Regulation 2089/84, supra note 74, at para. 11. 
95 Regulation 744/84, supra note 71, at para. II. 
96 See Regulation 2089/84, supra note 74, at paras. 16-19. 
97 [d. at paras. 16, 19. The Council's duty was lower than that calculated by the Com-
mission. See supra notes 71, 74, and accompanying text. 
98 Regulation 2089/84, supra note 74, at para. 21, art. 1(2). 
99 [d. at para. 24. 
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on ball bearings manufactured by Nippon and ToYO.100 The de-
termination of the normal value of Nippon and Toyo's ball bear-
ings was simplified because of their sale on the domestic mar-
ket. lol The Council relied on the Commission's findings for the 
appropriate export price and the injury determination. 102 The 
Council's definitive antidumping duties for Nippon and Toyo, 
while substantial, were lower than that provisionally calculated by 
the Commission.103 
3. Determination that Intra-Community Assembly by Nippon 
and Toyo was Legal 
Almost four years after the Council's imposition of definitive 
duties against Nippon and Toyo's small ball bearings, the Com-
mission opened another investigation of these two Japanese ex-
porters. I04 FEBMA's complaint alleged that Nippon and Toyo 
were assembling ball bearings in the Community in contravention 
of Regulation 2176/84 and in circumvention of the definitive 
antidumping duties imposed by the Council. lo5 The Commission 
subsequently terminated the investigation without extending the 
duties in force to ball bearings assembled in the Community.lo6 
The Commission examined three areas during its investigation 
of Nippon and Toyo's alleged violation of article 13(10) of Reg-
ulation 2176/84.107 The first consideration involved a determi-
nation that the assemblers within the Community were wholly-
owned subsidiaries of the Japanese exporters Nippon and 
ToYO.IOB Second, the Commission considered whether the assem-
bly companies increased their production of ball bearings in the 
Community after the initiation of the original investigation of the 
exporters. The Commission found that each assembly company 
100 Compare supra notes 81-90 with supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text. 
101 See Regulation 2089/84, supra note 74, at para. 11. In contrast, the normal value of 
the products of exporters from Singapore had to be constructed. Regulation 744184, supra 
note 71, at paras. 12-16; Regulation 2089/84, supra note 74, at para. 12. The Council 
adopted the Commission's provisional calculation of the constructed normal value. ld. 
102 See Regulation 2089/84, supra note 74, at paras. 16-21. 
103 See supra notes 71, 74, and accompanying text. 
104 Notice 88/C 150103, supra note 78, at 4. 
1051d. 
106 Decision 89/57, supra note 79, at 90. 
107 See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. 
108 Decision 89/57, supra note 79, at para. 6. 
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had increased its production by 40 percent following the period 
of 1981-1983, during which the increase in production was less 
than 2.5 percent. lOg 
The final aspect of the investigation involved determining the 
local content value of the intra-Community assembled ball bear-
ings. 110 The Commission included the costs of production in the 
value of Community-made. parts upon the showing of two re-
quirements. First, these parts or materials were required to con-
form to the requirements of article 13(10)(a) of the antidumping 
legislation. Second, the parts had to be of Community origin. 
The value of parts not meeting these requirements was estab-
lished by determining the prices the assembly companies paid for 
them. The Commission found that the value of parts originating 
in Japan was less than 60 percent of the total parts value of ball 
bearings assembled or produced in the Community. Therefore, 
the Commission found that there had not been a violation of 
article 13 and terminated the investigation. III 
B. Legal Challenges to Definitive Antidumping Duties 
A foreign exporter may challenge the Council's definitive an-
tidumping duty in the European Court. ll2 Both Nippon and 
Toyo exercised that privilege by filing separate applications for 
judicial review of the Council's actions. Nippon and Toyo alleged, 
inter alia, that the Council's calculation of the dumping margin 
was incorrect. 113 Nippon and Toyo argued that the Commission 
erred in comparing the export price, calculated on a transaction-
by-transaction basis, with the normal value, calculated by using 
the weighted average of the prices charged on the domestic mar-
ket. Nippon advanced the additional argument that the Commis-
sion did not use the correct method to calculate the appropriate 
adjustments to the export price. l14 These contentions will be dis-
cussed seriatim. 
109 [d. at para. 7. 
110 [d. at paras. 8-10. 
III [d. at Sole Article. 
112 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 173; see J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 
248-52; E. VERMULST, supra note 2, at 254-74; Kuyper, Judicial Protection and Judicial 
Review in the EEC, in LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 374-83. 
113 Nippon, supra note 67, at 1935-41; Toyo, supra note 76, at 1825-28. 
114 Nippon, supra note 67, at 1941-43. 
1990] ANTIDUMPING IN THE EEC 411 
1. "Comparable Basis" Does Not Mean Same Method 
The European Court rejected the arguments of both Nippon 
and Toyo with respect to whether the export price and the nor-
mal value must be calculated by the same method. ll5 The anti-
dumping legislation requires that the export price and the normal 
value be computed on a comparable basis. 116 In defending the 
validity of its calculation, the Council argued that the regulation 
contained at least ten methods by which to calculate the normal 
value and four methods by which to calculate the dumping mar-
gin. 117 The Council also argued that the rules for allowances exist 
so that factors affecting price comparability could be evaluated 
on the basis of different criteria. Most importantly, the Council 
contended that "fair comparison" does not refer to the calculation 
of export price and normal value because these are put on a 
comparable basis by adjustments to them, not by the methods by 
which they are calculated. IIB 
2. Adjustments to the Export Price 
The second argument Nippon raised was that the Council in-
correctly calculated the export price. 119 Nippon argued that the 
export price and the normal value must be calculated at the same 
level of trade. Nippon also claimed that the freight costs, which 
were greater in its domestic market, should not have been 
equated with the freight costs of export sales. Nippon stated that 
the Commission should not have subtracted the freight costs from 
export prices without also subtracting them from the domestic 
prices. Finally, Nippon also asserted that an allowance should 
have been made for the costs associated with customer service. 120 
Countering Nippon's contentions, the Council stated that the 
Commission had compared the normal value and export price at 
115/d. at 1962-70; Toyo, supra note 76, at 1852-55. The European Court rejected all 
of Nippon and Toyo's submissions. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
116 Regulation 2423/88, supra note 9, at art. 2(9)(a) ("[t]he normal value ... and the 
export price ... shall be compared as nearly as possible at the same time"); Regulation 
2176/84, supra note 6, at art. 2(9) ("the export price and the normal value shall be on a 
comparable basis"); Nippon, supra note 67, at 1963-64; Toyo, supra note 76, at 1853-54. 
117 Nippon, supra note 67, at 1937. 
118Id. 
119Id. at 1941-43. 
12°ld. at 1941-42. 
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the same level of trade, the ex-factory level.l2l The Council in-
dicated that it had made provisions to deduct the freight costs 
from Nippon's domestic prices. 122 Finally, the Council claimed 
that it accounted for the costs of customer service as long as those 
costs were shown to be associated with the sales in question. 123 
While these two cases involved the interpretation of Regulation 
3017179, the provisions in question are identical or substantially 
similar to the analogous provisions in Regulations 2176/84 and 
2423/88. Hence, the cases brought by Nippon and Toyo under 
Regulation 3017179 could be brought on the same grounds with 
the same results today under Regulation 2423/88. Regulation 
2423/88 was intended to clarify and consolidate the Community's 
antidumping legal framework. 124 Yet, if the European Court in-
terprets Regulation 2423/88 consistently with its predecessors, 
this regulation will only offer the Community a mere consolida-
tion of preexisting law. Suggestions for reform have included 
greater disclosure of the Commission's calculations and use of 
confidential information, as well as less reliance on the Commis-
sion's findings by the Council and European Court. 125 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the determination of antidumping duties, the calculation of 
the export price, normal value, the comparison of the two, and 
injury are left to the Commission and the Council. The Commis-
sion and the Council have had the opportunity to refine the 
procedures by which the appropriateness and amount of anti-
dumping duties are determined. The European Court has also 
granted the Community institutions great discretion in the ap-
plication of these measures. Challenges to antidumping duties 
have been based on the calculation and comparison of the normal 
value and export price. These challenges are unsuccessful be-
121 Id.; J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 107 (wholesalers' prices to retailers 
should be adjusted to the ex-factory level). The comparison should involve the same 
category of buyers or make allowances for differences in such. Id. 
122 Nippon, supra note 67, at 1937. 
123Id. at 1943. 
124 Regulation 2423/88, supra note 9, at 3. 
125 Davey, Antidumping Law in the GAIT and the EC, in LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 2, 
at 300-301; Jacobs, Observations on the Antidumping Law and Practice of the European Com-
munity, and Some Possible Reforms, in LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 358-59; ~ellis, 
Vermulst & Waer, Further Changes in the EEC Anti-Dumping Regulation: A Codification of 
Controversial Methodologies, 23 J. ·WORLD TRADE 21, 32-33 (Apr. 1989). 
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cause of the institutions' discretion and experience in calculating 
the export price and the normal value. Foreign exporters that 
want to target the Community's significant internal market will 
either have to set up assembly or production plants within the 
Community, as did Nippon and Toyo, or sell their products in 
an equitable manner alongside the Community producers. 
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